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IT’S A JUNGLE OUT THERE: 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM A 
LIABILITY-FREE AMAZON.COM 
Robert Sprague* 
 Through its website, Amazon.com retails its own products as well 
as those of nearly three million third-party vendors through the Amazon 
Marketplace.  With few exceptions, courts have concluded Amazon.com 
should not be considered a “seller” for purposes of strict products lia-
bility for products sold through its online Marketplace.  In many cases, 
this leaves consumers without recourse for injuries suffered due to de-
fective products purchased through Amazon.com, since many of these 
third-party vendors cannot be located.  This article raises the question 
of whether Amazon.com, as a matter of public policy, should be subject 
to liability since it can better absorb the cost of compensating for injuries 
resulting from defects.  This article concludes that courts and legisla-
tures need to recognize that traditional methods of selling products to 
consumers have been upended by companies such as Amazon.com and 
the laws need to be updated to reflect the new methods by which Ama-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Retail giant Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) now accounts for roughly 
half of all online retail sales,1 offering over 100 million items for sale.2  
It is inevitable that as Amazon places millions of products into the stream 
of commerce, some of those products are defective, causing personal in-
jury and property damage.3  Unlike traditional sellers, Amazon now sells 
a majority of its products through third party vendors taking advantage 
of Amazon’s web-based marketplace platform.  As a result, Amazon 
claims that it is not the actual “seller” of a majority of products sold 
through its site, asserting, that it is not subject to liability when those 
products prove to be defective.  This article first, in Part II, provides an 
overview of Amazon’s role as a U.S. retailer, with particular emphasis 
on its online “marketplace” in which products are sold on Amazon’s 
website by Amazon-approved third-party sellers.  In Part III, this article 
reviews the public policy arguments behind the evolution of strict prod-
ucts liability, with a special emphasis on how some states have carved 
 
 1. MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY POWER AND 
DEMOCRACY 444 (2019). Total U.S. online retail sales as a percentage of total U.S. retail sales 
are projected to be around twelve percent in 2020. See, e.g., J. CLEMENT, E-COMMERCE 
SHARE OF TOTAL RETAIL SALES IN UNITED STATES FROM 2013 TO 2021, (Statista, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/379112/e-commerce-share-of-retail-sales-in-us/. 
 2. See 2018 Annual Report, AMAZON (2019), https://ir.aboutamazon.com/files/doc_fi-
nancials/annual/2018-Annual-Report.pdf [hereinafter Amazon 2018 Annual Report] (stating 
that over 100 million items alone are eligible for free shipping through the Prime membership 
program). 
 3. See infra Appendix (summarizing nineteen recent products liability court decisions, 
with associated claims, from sixteen lawsuits naming Amazon as a defendant); see also Alex-
andra Berzon, Hoverboards Test Amazon’s Liability in Product Safety—Cases Challenge Idea 
that the Tech Giant Is a Mere Platform to Connect Buyers and Sellers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 
2019, at A1 (stating that Amazon has faced seventeen lawsuits over defective hoverboards 
alone, about half of which are still active). 
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out exceptions for “innocent” sellers who merely pass along products 
within the chain of distribution from manufacturer to consumer.  Part IV 
examines recent court rulings addressing Amazon’s principal defense to 
strict products liability when the product was sold on Amazon’s website 
by an Amazon third-party seller—that Amazon is not entitled to any “in-
nocent seller” exceptions because it is not even a “seller” subject to any 
strict products liability laws.4  Part IV also reviews courts’ application 
of Amazon’s immunity under the Communications Decency Act vis-à-
vis product liability claims.  Part V provides an analysis of whether, for 
public policy purposes, Amazon should be considered a “seller” under 
strict products liability laws for third-party sale. 
II. AMAZON ONLINE MARKETPLACE 
In the past twenty years, Amazon has undergone a significant trans-
formation.  In 1999, ninety-seven percent of the company’s merchandise 
sales were its own first-party sales.5  In 2018, fifty-eight percent of Am-
azon’s physical gross merchandise sales were through third-party sales 
on its website.6  This reportedly represented $200 billion in worldwide 
sales by 3 million active sellers.7  This growth in third-party sales was 
no accident.  According to Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, it resulted from 
providing the sellers with “the very best” selling tools, fulfillment ser-
vices, and access to Amazon’s Prime membership program.8  In fact, 
according to a report by the Wall Street Journal: 
Amazon doesn’t make it easy for customers to see that many prod-
ucts aren’t sold by the company.  Many third-party items the Journal 
examined were listed as Amazon Prime eligible and sold through the 
Fulfillment by Amazon program, which generally ships items from 
 
 4. Alternative claims plaintiffs have sought against Amazon related to allegedly defec-
tive products, such as negligence and breach of warranty, are not addressed in this article. See 
infra Appendix (summarizing recent strict products liability claims actions against Amazon 
and associated claims). 
 5. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to Share-
holders); see also Daniel Keyes, Jeff Bezos Says Third Parties Are Besting Amazon—Here’s 
Why That’s Good for the Firm, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-notes-third-party-sellers-are-besting-amazon-2019-4. 
 6. Keyes, supra note 5. 
 7. Juozas Kaziukėnas, Marketplaces Year in Review 2019, MARKETPLACE PULSE (Dec. 
16, 2019), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/marketplaces-year-in-review-2019. 
 8. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to Share-
holders); see also Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A 
Seller Not a Neutral Platform 10–13 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
612, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3467059 (describing how Amazon manages third-party 
sellers and sales). 
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Amazon warehouses in Amazon-branded boxes.  The actual seller’s 
name appeared only in small print on the listing page.9 
The growth of Amazon’s sales have had negative societal impacts, 
from reports of high rates of worker injuries at Amazon’s fulfillment 
centers,10 to fatal traffic accidents involving drivers delivering Amazon 
packages,11 to, particularly relating to third-party sellers, increasing sales 
of counterfeit and unsafe goods.12  In a recent investigation, the Wall 
 
 9. Alexandra Berzon et al., Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site—The Result: Thou-
sands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2019, at B1. 
 10. See, e.g., Find Out What Injuries Are Like at the Amazon Warehouse that Handled 
Your Packages, REVEAL (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.revealnews.org/article/find-out-what-
injuries-are-like-at-the-amazon-warehouse-that-handled-your-packages/; Letter from Eliza-
beth Warren, U.S. Senator, Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senator, & Joseph P. Kennedy, III, Mem-
ber of Congress, to Jeffrey Bezos, CEO, Amazon.com (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.war-
ren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019.12.20%20Letter%20to%20Mr.%20Bezos%20on%20Fa
ll%20River%20Facility.pdf. See also Josh Dzieza, A Seventh Amazon Employee Dies of 
COVID-19 as the Company Refuses to Say How Many Are Sick, VERGE (May 14, 2020, 8:20 
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/14/21259474/amazon-warehouse-worker-death-in-
diana (noting that Amazon employees have criticized the company for failing to notify em-
ployees when their colleagues were diagnosed with the virus); Press Release, Massachusetts 
Attorney General, AG Healey Leads Multistate Group Urging Amazon and Whole Foods to 
Strengthen Worker Protections During COVID-19 Pandemic (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.mass.gov/news/ag-healey-leads-multistate-group-urging-amazon-and-whole-
foods-to-strengthen-worker. 
 11. See, e.g., Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility 
for the Human Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/09/05/us/amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html; Kate Cox, Driver Train-
ing Was Reportedly Too Much of “a Bottleneck” for Amazon, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 26, 2019, 
9:55 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/12/driver-training-was-reportedly-too-
much-of-a-bottleneck-for-amazon/ (reporting internal Amazon documents indicated the com-
pany planned to implement driver safety training courses but scrapped them in order to get 
drivers up and running faster); Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, Amazon’s Next-Day 
Delivery Has Brought Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—But the World’s Biggest 
Retailer Has a System to Escape the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths. 
In perhaps the ultimate irony, it is reported that in 2013 Amazon’s first chief financial officer, 
while riding her bike, was struck and killed by a delivery van carrying Amazon packages. See 
Hayley Peterson, Amazon Executive Was Killed After Colliding with a Van Delivering the 
Company’s Packages, Report Reveals, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/amazons-joy-covey-killed-company-delivery-van-report-2019-12. 
 12. See, e.g., Kaity Y. Emerson, From Amazon’s Domination of E-Commerce to Its 
Foray into Patent Litigation: Will Amazon Succeed as “The District of Amazon Federal 
Court”?, 21 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 71, 85 (2019) (stating that Amazon has a pervasive counterfeit 
problem); Eugene Kim, Amazon Added a First-Ever Warning About Counterfeit Products to 
Its Earnings Report, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/am-
azon-10k-warns-investors-about-counterfeit-problem-for-first-time.html (reporting that for 
the first time Amazon listed counterfeit goods as a risk factor in a recent earnings report; 
reporting also that the problem could get worse as Amazon shifts more of its sales to third-
party sellers); Timothy Puko & Alex Leary, U.S. Considers Censuring Amazon Sites, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2019, at B3 (reporting that the Trump administration is considering adding 
some of Amazon’s overseas operations to a list of global marketplaces known for counterfeit 
goods). 
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Street Journal found 4,152 items for sale on Amazon’s website that have 
been declared unsafe by federal agencies, are deceptively labeled, or are 
banned by federal regulators.13  After Amazon was informed of the prod-
ucts identified by the Wall Street Journal, nearly half remained on its 
website.14  In addition, a wave of Chinese merchants have joined Ama-
zon’s millions of third-party sellers worldwide.15  A new product listing 
is reportedly uploaded to Amazon from China every 1/50th of a second, 
many of them mislabeled, defective, or counterfeit.16  Some third-party 
sellers are literally selling garbage on the Amazon website.17  The Wall 
Street Journal’s conclusion is that Amazon either has lost control of its 
massive platforms or declines to control them.18  At the same time, for 
many third-party sellers, Amazon’s actions can have tremendous im-
pacts on their sales.19  For many of these sellers, Amazon controls the 
prices they can charge, forbids sales to middlemen, and compels the 
sellers to buy ads on Amazon’s website.20 
 
 13. See Berzon et al., supra note 9 (noting further that among the products identified, at 
least 2,000 were for toys and medications that lacked warnings about health risks to children). 
 14. See id. (noting further that when Amazon did take down listings for banned items, 
the same products sometimes reappeared under new accounts). 
 15. See Jon Emont, Amazon’s China Push Puts Consumers at Risk—Chinese Factories 
Wooed by Retailer Are Big Source of Problem Listings, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2019, at A1. 
 16. See id.; see also Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse, 
CNBC (July 8, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-coun-
terfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html; Casey Hopkins, Amazon Is Complicit with Counterfeit-
ing (Updated), ELEVATIONLAB (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.eleva-
tionlab.com/blogs/news/amazon-is-complicit-with-counterfeit-sellers# (“[W]hen Chinese 
counterfeiters tool up and make copies of your product, send that inventory to Amazon, then 
overtake the real product’s buy box by auto-lowering the price—it’s a real problem. Custom-
ers are unknowingly buying crap versions of the product, while both Amazon and the scam-
mers are profiting, and the reputation you’ve built goes down the toilet.”). 
 17. See Khadeeja Safdar et al., Consumers Might Be Buying Trash on Amazon—Liter-
ally—Dumpster Divers Say They Sell Discards on the Site. We Did, Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
18, 2019, at A1; see also Joshua Rosario, Online Order of Diapers Arrives at Jersey City 
Home—But They Were Already Soiled, JERSEY J. (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.nj.com/hud-
son/2020/01/online-order-of-diapers-arrives-at-jersey-city-home-but-they-were-already-
soiled.html (reporting that one of two boxes of diapers purchased from Amazon contained 
soiled diapers). 
 18. See Berzon et al., supra note 9. 
 19. See Karen Weise, Prime Power: How Amazon Squeezes the Businesses Behind Its 
Store, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/amazon-sellers.html 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 20. See id. In fact, Amazon determines whether an offering by a third party is eligible to 
be displayed as a featured offer, sometimes will credit customers’ accounts when it believes 
a third-party seller’s price is too high, and suspend third-party sellers without providing de-
tailed reasons for the suspension. See Online Platforms and Mkt. Power, Part 2: Innovation 
and Entrepreneurship, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 23, 25, 27–28 (2019) (Amazon Responses to Cicilline 
Questions for the Record); see also Annie Palmer, Amazon Lifts FedEx Ground Delivery Ban 
for Sellers, FedEx Shares Rise, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020, 7:08 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/amazon-lifts-fedex-ground-delivery-ban-for-sellers.html 
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Should Amazon, which serves as an integral part of the overall mar-
keting and selling of goods, bear the cost of injuries resulting from de-
fective products sold through its website?21  Or should it be immune from 
liability because it merely passes along defective products from manu-
facturer to consumer? 
III. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE “INNOCENT SELLER” 
DEFENSE 
Products liability law is rooted in common law.22  In the 1916 case 
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,23 the New York Court of Ap-
peals extended a manufacturer’s liability for negligence to consumers 
who did not have a direct relationship with the manufacturer.  (Here, 
MacPherson purchased his Buick from a dealer, not directly from 
Buick.24)  Writing for the majority, Justice Benjamin Cardozo concluded 
that where a product is reasonably certain to pose a risk to others beyond 
the purchaser, the manufacturer has a duty of care—independent of con-
tract.25  Over the next fifty years, courts began imposing strict liability 
against manufacturers based mainly on three public policy considera-
tions outlined by William Prosser in The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer): (1) the law should protect consumers injured 
by defective products who are helpless to protect themselves; (2) suppli-
ers, by placing goods upon the market, represent to the public that the 
goods are suitable and safe for use—“The supplier has invited and solic-
ited the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be permitted to 
avoid the responsibility by saying that he has made no contract with the 
consumer”; and (3) it is much more efficient for any supplier in the 
 
(reporting that in December 2019, Amazon had suspended third-party sellers’ access to 
FedEx’s ground and home delivery services for Prime orders). 
 21. Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964) (explaining 
the “integral” role that retailers play in “bear[ing] the cost of injuries resulting from defective 
products”). 
 22. Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on 
Twenty Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2000). 
 23. 217 N.Y. 382, 384-85, 94–95 (1916) (affirming judgment in favor of purchaser of 
automobile injured when wheel collapsed). 
 24. Id. at 384. 
 25. See id. at 389; see also William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960) (“In 1916 there came the phe-
nomenon of the improvident Scot who squandered his gold upon a Buick, and so left his name 
forever imprinted upon the law of products liability. Cardozo, wielding a mighty axe, burst 
over the ramparts, and buried the general rule [of nonliability to persons not in privity] under 
the exception.”); Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1021 (noting that MacPherson set the stage 
for products liability law to develop). 
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distribution chain to be “liable directly to the ultimate user.”26  As noted 
by Zollers et al.: 
The move to strict liability incorporates the faultless characteristic of 
breach of warranty without all the baggage of contract law such as 
privity and the ability to bargain away warranties.  It simply holds a 
manufacturer and any other distributor of the product strictly liable 
if a product it either produced or sold contains a defect that causes 
injury.27 
Strict products liability was ultimately expressed in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 402A: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business 
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in 
which it is sold.28 
This rule applies even if: “(2) . . . (a) the seller has exercised all 
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user 
or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.”29  Section 402A, which reflects prod-
ucts liability law in a majority of states,30 “eliminate[d] privity so that a 
user or consumer, without having to establish negligence, could bring an 
action against a manufacturer, as well as against any other member of a 
distributive chain that had sold a product containing a manufacturing de-
fect.”31 
 
 26. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 1122–24. Zollers et al. note that for a while, courts 
applied warranty theories as a bridge between negligent and strict products liability. See 
Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1022. An additional public policy argument is that strict prod-
ucts liability will incentivize safe products. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“It is to the public interest to dis-
courage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public.”); Ryan 
Bullard, Out-Teching Products Liability: Reviving Strict Products Liability in an Age of Am-
azon, 20 N.C. J. L. & TECH. ON. 181, 191–92 (2019). 
 27. Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1022 (“It is irrelevant whether someone in breach of 
contract negligently failed to fulfill his or her promises. The only relevant issue is whether the 
promises were broken.”). 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT 
FOR PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) [hereinafter § 
402A]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Adam Feeney, Note, In Search of a Remedy: Do State Laws Exempting Sellers 
from Strict Product Liability Adequately Protect Consumers Harmed by Defective Chinese-
Manufactured Products?, 34 J. CORP. L. 567, 570 (2009). 
 31. Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB., at 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
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Echoing Prosser’s second public policy argument,32 since all parties 
have participated in and profited from the product’s distribution, “they 
should not be heard to complain if they are held responsible for defects 
in the products they sell when the plaintiff has no means of recovery 
from the manufacturer.”33  Holding these participants, including non-
manufacturer sellers, strictly liable promotes “the public policy that an 
injured party not have to bear the cost of his injuries simply because the 
product manufacturer is out of reach.”34  As such, this public policy ar-
gument is strongest when the product manufacture is bankrupt, cannot 
be identified, or is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction or service of 
process;35 and it is weakest when the plaintiff does have an adequate 
remedy against the manufacturer.36 
When Prosser argued that a “privity-less” strict liability regime is 
more efficient,37 he was arguing from the consumer’s perspective—
eliminating the need to pursue multiple lawsuits until the manufacturer 
was finally held liable for the damages caused by its defective product.38  
But non-manufacturer sellers see an inefficiency—they must engage in 
two lawsuits: the first to defend against the injured consumer; and (as-
suming the consumer prevails) a second action seeking indemnity from 
the manufacturer.39  Stronger arguments against holding non-manufac-
turer sellers strictly liable are that they simply did not create the defect 
in the product and they “are ill-equipped to defend a product which they 
neither designed nor manufactured.”40  In particular, they “usually act 
merely as conduits of the product between the manufacturer and the con-
sumer.”41 
By the end of the 1970s, a majority of states had adopted revisions 
to their products liability statutes that limited the strict liability of non-
 
 32. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 33. Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A Proposal for 
Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2003). 
 34. Dunn v. Kanawha City. Bd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151, 157 (W. Va. 1995); see also 
Samuel Friedland Family Enters. v. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 1994) (“The un-
derlying basis for the doctrine of strict liability is that those entities within a product’s distrib-
utive chain who profit from the sale or distribution of the product to the public, rather than an 
innocent person injured by it, should bear the financial burden of even an undetectable product 
defect.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 35. See Sachs, supra note 33, at 1037. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See supra text (third public policy argument) accompanying note 26. 
 38. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 1123–24. 
 39. See Feeney, supra note 30, at 571–72 (citing Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort 
Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA. L. REV. 
213, 229–30 (1987)). 
 40. Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distrib-
utors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA. L. REV. 213, 227–28 (1987). 
 41. Id. at 227. 
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manufacturer sellers.42  Frank Cavico categorizes the limitations into 
four basic categories: Indemnification Statutes allow the plaintiff to re-
cover against a non-manufacturer product seller on a strict liability the-
ory, but then require the manufacturer to indemnify the seller;43 “Sealed 
Container” Statutes generally hold a non-manufacturer seller not liable 
if the product was sold in its original condition or package, no express 
warranties were made, and the seller did not have knowledge that the 
product was defective or unreasonably dangerous;44 Absolute Bar Stat-
utes absolutely exempt non-manufacturer sellers from strict products li-
ability;45 and Partial Bar Statutes generally exempt non-manufacturer 
sellers from strict product liability if the manufacturer can be identified 
and is within the court’s jurisdiction.46  Generally, these limitations to 
liability will not apply if the seller knew or should have known of the 
 
 42. See id. at 237. These revisions were primarily based on a proposed Model Uniform 
Products Liability Act. See id. at 233–37 (analyzing the Model Uniform Products Liability 
Act); Feeney, supra note 30, at 572–73 (providing overview of the Model Uniform Products 
Liability Act); see also Zollers et al., supra note 22, at 1023–32 (analyzing attempts to enact 
a federal products liability act). 
 43. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 237 (citing e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684A 
(1982)); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 832.1 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g) 
(West 2014). 
 44. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 238 (citing e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Supp. 
1986)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (West 1995). 
 45. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 238–39 (citing e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,181 
(1985); see, e.g., S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (1979) (unless the seller knew, or, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, should have known, of the defective condition of the final product); 
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h). 
 46. See Cavico, supra note 40, at 239–40 (citing e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
402(1) (1986); see also Feeney, supra note 30, at 574 (discussing state statutes that hold non-
manufacturer sellers strictly liable where the court cannot obtain jurisdiction over the manu-
facturer or where the manufacturer is insolvent); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41(Subd. 
2)(3) (West 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040(2)(a) (West 1991); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-20-2-4 (West 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2(a) (West 1996) (providing non-
manufacturing seller immunity from strict liability for sealed container unless manufacturer 
is not subject to court’s jurisdiction); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78(B)(2) (West 2001) 
(providing non-manufacturing “supplier” subject to strict liability where, inter alia, manufac-
turer is insolvent or not subject to courts’ jurisdiction); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 82.003(a)(7) (West 2006) (providing non-manufacturing seller subject to strict liability 
where, inter alia, manufacturer is insolvent or not subject to courts’ jurisdiction); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-7-31(b)(12)–(13) (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.762(2) (West 2019) 
(providing dismissal of non-manufacturer seller where manufacturer is before court and from 
whom total recovery may be had); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-9(c)(1) (West 1995) (providing 
non-manufacturing seller can escape strict product liability by identifying manufacturer); 
ALA. CODE § 6-5-521(d) (1979) (requiring plaintiff to dismiss non-manufacturing seller if 
manufacturer can be identified and an action is commenced against it); Pierce v. Amazon.com 
Serves., Inc., No. 4:19-CV-393-KOB, 2020 WL 374836, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2020) (ap-
plying ALA. CODE § 6-5-521(d)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1, 
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (discussing application of innocent seller provisions). 
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defect or if the seller somehow created the defect that was a substantial 
cause of the incident that gave rise to the action.47 
As the preceding review demonstrates, a number of states have en-
acted statutes that potentially immunize non-manufacturer sellers from 
strict products liability where the seller merely passes the product along 
the distribution chain from manufacturer to consumer.  For the most part, 
though, these statutes fail to clarify what qualifies as a “seller” under 
strict products liability laws. 
IV. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS AGAINST AMAZON BASED 
ON THIRD-PARTY SALES 
In a series of products liability cases brought against Amazon, 
which had facilitated the sale of an allegedly injurious defective product 
by a third party, the key consideration of the courts was not whether 
Amazon was an immunized seller, but whether Amazon should even 
qualify as a “seller” of the product in question.48  The analysis of cases 
reveals that courts have been inconsistent in settling this question. 
A. Cases Finding Amazon Is Not a “Seller” 
In McDonald v. LG Electronics USA, Inc.,49 the plaintiff alleged 
injuries suffered due to defective rechargeable batteries.50  The batteries, 
manufactured by LG Electronics, were sold and shipped by Safetymind, 
an Amazon third-party seller.51  The district court pointed out that under 
Maryland law, “[i]rrespective of whether the theory of recovery is breach 
of warranty, negligence or strict liability, a plaintiff must show ‘three 
product litigation basics’—defect, attribution of defect to seller, and a 
 
 47. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-684(A); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001(b); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41(Subd. 3); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
11-1-63(h); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2(a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-9(d); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2307.78(B); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 82.003(a); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-31(b). See generally Sachs, supra note 33 (an-
alyzing statutes immunizing non-manufacturer sellers from strict product liability); see also 
infra Appendix (summarizing statutes immunizing non-manufacturer sellers from strict prod-
uct liability). 
 48. As Amazon’s third-party sales volume exceeded fifty percent of total consumer sales, 
so also did the products liability claims against Amazon begin. See Amazon 2018 Annual 
Report, supra note 2 (reflecting third-party sales exceeding fifty percent of Amazon’s con-
sumer sales beginning in 2015). See, e.g., Mavromati v. Spot, LLC, No. CV 14-03333 SJO 
(Ex), 2016 WL 4820634, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016) (dismissing products liability claim 
against Amazon and other defendants due to plaintiff’s failure to raise a genuine issue whether 
defect in product caused death; first apparent reported products liability claim against Amazon 
related to a third-party sale). 
 49. 219 F. Supp. 3d 533 (D. Md. 2016). 
 50. See id. at 535. 
 51. See id. 
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causal relationship between the defect and the injury.”52  The plaintiff 
failed to establish the second element, according to the court, because 
the plaintiff alleged LG Electronics and Safetymind, but not Amazon, 
had placed the defective product in the stream of commerce.53  Finally, 
the court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim, con-
cluding Amazon was not a merchant under Maryland’s Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC): “Here, Amazon’s role as the ‘platform’ for the 
third-party sales does not qualify it as a merchant or a seller under Mar-
yland’s UCC.”54 
The notion of what constitutes a seller for purposes of products lia-
bility law was later emphasized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
applying Maryland law.  In Erie Insurance Company v. Amazon.com, 
Inc.,55 a consumer purchased an LED headlamp on Amazon’s website, 
though it was sold by Dream Light and fulfilled by Amazon.56  After the 
purchaser gave the headlamp to a friend as a gift, the friend’s house 
caught fire allegedly due to defective batteries in the headlamp.57  As 
described by the court, Amazon’s involvement in the transaction con-
sisted of receiving the headlamp from Dream Light, storing the head-
lamp in its warehouse, retrieving the headlamp from its warehouse, ship-
ping the headlamp to the purchaser via UPS, collecting the purchase 
price, and forwarding the purchase price to Dream Light, less a service 
fee.58  Dream Light itself set the price for the headlamp and created the 
content of the product’s description used on the Amazon site.59 
The plaintiff argued that Amazon, through its fulfillment services 
program, took so much control over the transaction that it effectively 
became the seller and therefore became responsible under theories of 
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in tort.60  The court 
 
 52. See id. at 541 (quoting Laing v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 949 A.2d 26, 39 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2008) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 779 A.2d 362, 370 (Md. 
2001))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the McDonald court initially categorized 
McDonald’s claim as for products liability, it focused primarily on counts of negligence and 
breach of implied warranty. See id. at 541–42. 
 53. See id. at 542. 
 54. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW § 2-314(1) (1975) (defining a merchant as 
“a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practice or goods involved in the transaction”)). 
 55. 925 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 56. See id. at 138. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at 140. According to the plaintiff, “[t]he purchaser ordered from Amazon, using 
Amazon’s website. The purchaser paid Amazon directly. Amazon packaged the product, in 
Amazon’s warehouse, delivered it to the carrier, assumed the risk of credit card fraud, received 
payment, collected Amazon’s fee, and presumably forwarded any remaining balance to 
Dream Light. The purchaser never had direct contact—or, really, privity of any sort—with 
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rejected the plaintiff’s argument, stating it found “no indication that the 
term ‘seller,’ as used in Maryland’s products liability law, should be un-
derstood in any manner other than its ordinary meaning[]”—a “seller” 
sells goods, and a “sale” means passing title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price.61  But the court adopted this interpretation of Maryland law 
with very little persuasive precedent.  It cited McDonald for the propo-
sition that Amazon was not a seller,62 but the McDonald court noted that 
it did so because the plaintiff’s complaint failed to list Amazon as a party 
that had placed the allegedly defective product in the stream of com-
merce.63  The Erie court also cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court hold-
ing that auctioneers are not “sellers” for purposes of § 402A;64 a Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals holding that Amazon was not liable as a seller 
for copyright infringement of a pillowcase sold by a third-party seller on 
Amazon’s website;65 and Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.,66 a federal dis-
trict court case holding Amazon was not a “seller” under Pennsylvania 
law, a finding that was later vacated by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.67 
Amazon was sued under Tennessee’s Products Liability Act after 
the batteries in a hoverboard, purchased through Amazon and given as a 
2015 Christmas present, caused a fire that consumed the plaintiff’s 
house.68  Although the plaintiff purchased the hoverboard through 
 
Dream Light. The contract was between him and Amazon, not between him and Dream 
Light.” 
 61. Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COMM. LAW §§ 2-103(1)(d), 
2-106); accord Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(stating that, under New York Law, failure to take title to a product places an entity outside 
the chain of distribution). But see Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 
(FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL 3546197, at *25-26 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (citing Laidlow v. Hariton 
Machinery Co., Inc., 335 N.J. Super. 330, 337 (App. Div. 2000)) (stating that holding title is 
not a requirement before strict liability will be imposed under New Jersey law); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 20(a) (“One sells a product when, in a com-
mercial context, one transfers ownership thereto either for use or consumption or for resale 
leading to ultimate use or consumption.” (emphasis added)). 
 62. See Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 541–42). 
 63. See McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 542 (finding also that Amazon’s role as a platform 
provider did not qualify it as a merchant under Maryland’s UCC); see supra notes 52–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. See Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 
279, 283 (Pa. 1989)). 
 65. See id. (citing Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879, 886–88 
(Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 66. 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 67. 930 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2019), reh’g on banc granted, opinion vacated, 936 F.3d 182 
(3rd Cir. 2019). 
 68. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1 (M.D. 
Tenn. May 30, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 930 F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting 
the parties did not dispute that the hoverboard’s lithium-ion battery pack caused the fire). 
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Amazon’s website, Amazon contended that the actual seller was third-
party seller W2M Trading (also known as W–Deals), located in China.69  
The district court noted that Amazon did not make any statements or 
representations about the hoverboard, develop the product detail page 
content on its webpage, make any representations to the plaintiff about 
the hoverboard before or at the time of purchase, or design or manufac-
ture the hoverboard.70 
According to the court, nearly all of Amazon’s hoverboard sales 
were through third-party sellers, earning Amazon over $200 million be-
tween September 2015 through November 2015.71  In November 2015, 
Amazon began investigating the safety of hoverboards after learning that 
a hoverboard sold by W–Deals had burst into flames.72  By December 
10, 2015, Amazon had reports of at least seventeen complaints of hover-
board fires or explosions in the United States alone from hoverboards 
sold on Amazon’s website.73  On that date, Amazon decided to suspend 
all international sales of hoverboards, and on December 12, sent “non-
alarmist” emails to U.S. Amazon hoverboard purchasers stating, “There 
have been news reports of safety issues involving products like the one 
you purchased that contain rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.”74 
Amazon argued it is not a “seller” under the Tennessee Products 
Liability Act (“TPLA”)75 “because it did not hold title to the product, set 
the price of the product, develop the product offer, or ship the product 
directly to [the p]laintiff.”76  The TPLA immunizes sellers from liability 
unless: 
(1) The seller exercised substantial control over that aspect of the 
design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that 
caused the alleged harm for which recovery of damages is sought; 
(2) Altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modifica-
tion was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of 
damages is sought; 
(3) The seller gave an express warranty . . . ; 
(4) The manufacturer or distributor of the product or part in ques-
tion is not subject to service of process in this state and the long-arm 
statutes of Tennessee do not serve as the basis for obtaining service of 
process; or 
 
 69. Id. at *2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *3. 
 72. Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *4. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *4–5. 
 75. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-28-101 to 29-28-108 (1978). 
 76. Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6. 
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(5) The manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent.77 
The plaintiff sought to hold Amazon liable under exception (4) 
above because it was undisputed that the manufacturer of the hoverboard 
at issue was unknown.78 
The district court therefore turned to whether Amazon qualified as 
a “seller” under the TPLA, which states that a “ ‘ [s]eller’ includes a re-
tailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual or entity en-
gaged in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, 
or for use or consumption.”79  Amazon argued it was not a “seller” under 
the TPLA “because it did not hold title to the product, set the price of the 
product, develop the product offer, or ship the product directly to the 
plaintiff.”80  Alternatively, the plaintiff argued Amazon was “a ‘co-
seller’ of the hoverboard, along with W2M Trading, and it act[ed] as a 
‘retailer’ or ‘distributor’ of the product because it exercised complete 
control over the sale and kept the entire purchase price paid by [the plain-
tiff].”81 
Since “retailer” and “distributor” are not defined by the TPLA, the 
court looked to both the Merriam–Webster and Black’s Law dictionaries, 
concluding Amazon was a service provider, not a “seller”: 
Amazon did not hold title to the product sold here, did not set the 
price of the product, and did not create the text describing or making 
representations about the product.  Amazon’s role in the transaction 
was to provide a mechanism to facilitate the interchange between the 
entity seeking to sell the product and the individual who sought to 
buy it.82 
As in Erie Insurance Company v. Amazon.com, Inc.,83 the Fox dis-
trict court supported its decision with the later-vacated district court 
holding of Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.84 that Amazon was not a 
“seller” under Pennsylvania law.85  Finally, the Fox district court con-
cluded that Amazon had no duty to warn the plaintiff about the 
 
 77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1978). 
 78. Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6. 
 79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (“ ‘ Seller’ also includes a lessor or bailor engaged 
in the business of leasing or bailment of a product.”). 
 80. See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6. 
 81. See id. The plaintiff also argued Amazon was “ ‘ an entity engaged in the business of 
selling a product.’ ”  Id. 
 82. Id. at *7; accord Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc., 120 N.E.3d 885, 895 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2019), motion for reconsideration granted, 129 N.E.3d 461 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 2019). 
 83. 925 F.3d at 144; see also supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 84. 295 F. Supp. 3d at 496. 
 85. 930 F.3d 136, 153 (3rd Cir. 2019), reh’g on banc granted, opinion vacated, 936 F.3d 
182 (3rd Cir. 2019). The Fox court also cited McDonald v. LG Elecs, USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 
3d 533 (D. Md. 2016), in support of its conclusion that Amazon was not a seller. See Fox, 
2018 WL 2431628, at *8; see also supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
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hoverboard hazards since it was neither the seller nor the manufacturer, 
but merely a facilitator of the hoverboard’s sale.86 
On appeal,87 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened the def-
inition of “seller” under the TPLA beyond just whether title had trans-
ferred.88  The appeals court found persuasive and adopted the plaintiff’s 
argument that the definition of “seller” should encompass “any individ-
ual or entity regularly engaged in exercising sufficient control over a 
product in connection with its sale, lease, or bailment, for livelihood or 
gain.”89  In particular, the court believed this definition was consistent 
with the remedial purpose of the TPLA: “A primary purpose of [the 
TPLA] is to ensure that an injured consumer may maintain a strict lia-
bility action against whomever is most likely to compensate him for his 
injuries.”90  However, in applying the facts to the case, the appeals court 
concluded that Amazon did not exercise sufficient control over the 
hoverboard to be deemed a “seller” under the TPLA: Amazon “did not 
choose to offer the hoverboard for sale, did not set the price of the hover-
board, and did not make any representations about the safety or specifi-
cations of the hoverboard on its marketplace.”91 
 
 86. See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *10. The Fox district court also ruled against the 
plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, concluding the plaintiff had 
not demonstrated any losses as a result of unfair or deceptive practices by Amazon. See id. at 
*14. 
 87. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 88. In particular, the court noted that the TPLA’s definition of “ ‘ seller’ expressly in-
cludes a ‘lessor’ and a ‘bailor,’ neither of which necessarily transfers title to the products they 
lease or bail.” Id. at 423; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (1978). 
 89. Fox, 930 F.3d at 423. The Fox appeals court also cited cases that considered or 
adopted constructions of “seller” that “hinge on the degree of control exercised over a prod-
uct.” Id. at 425 (citing Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 139; Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. 
Supp. 3d 766, 776–77 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Carpenter v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-03221-JST, 
2019 WL 1259158, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398–99; 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *7–10; Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498; Stiner, 
120 N.E.3d at 895). 
 90. Id. at 424 (citing Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tenn. 1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. at 425 (citing Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 776–77, 780–81; Carpenter, 2019 WL 
1259158, at *5; Stiner, 120 N.E.3d at 895); accord Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, 
at *12 (concluding policy argument of shifting the risk up the distribution chain cannot alone 
transform Amazon into a “product seller”). While affirming the district court’s dismissal of 
the plaintiff’s Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim (see Fox, 930 F.3d at 428–29), the 
appeals court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn 
claim against Amazon: because the December 12, 2015 email did not inform hoverboard pur-
chasers of any of the actions Amazon had taken to evaluate the dangers posed by hoverboard, 
that the reported safety issues included a risk of fire or explosion, and that Amazon had ceased 
all hoverboard sales worldwide, there was a genuine issue of fact whether the plaintiff would 
have relied on those facts. See Fox, 930 F.3d at 426–28; cf., Love v. Weecoo (TM), 774 F. 
App.x 519 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s negligent failure to warn claim 
against Amazon on basis that it could reasonably be inferred Amazon had constructive 
knowledge of the potential risk of fire associated with hoverboard at issue at time of sale). 
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B. Cases Finding Amazon May Be a “Seller” 
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc.,92 
the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin stated that the 
case’s key dispute was whether Amazon qualified as a “seller” or “dis-
tributor” under Wisconsin’s products liability statute.93  Noting that Wis-
consin’s statute specifies when sellers or distributors are not liable, ra-
ther than what entities are liable, the district court concluded the purpose 
of the statute “was to limit when a plaintiff may target a nonmanufacturer 
defendant, but not who may be held liable as a nonmanufacturer defend-
ant.”94  Applying Wisconsin law, the district court also categorically re-
jected that a formal transfer of ownership is required to hold an entity 
strictly liable for a defective product,95 accepting the principle that strict 
liability derives from the act of putting the defective product into the 
stream of commerce.96 
Acknowledging that Wisconsin law does not impose liability if an 
entity plays only a peripheral role in putting a defective article into the 
stream of commerce, the district court focused on whether “Amazon [is] 
a peripheral entity like an auctioneer or . . . an integral part of the chain 
of distribution more akin to the lessor in Kemp[.]”97  The district court 
concluded that Amazon was an integral part of the chain of distribu-
tion—“an entity well-positioned to allocate the risks of defective prod-
ucts to the participants in the chain.”98  The court then summarized the 
facts supporting this conclusion: 
Amazon provided the only conduit between XMJ, the Chinese 
[third-party] seller, and the American marketplace.  Without Ama-
zon, XMJ products would not be available at all in Wisconsin. Am-
azon did not directly set the price for the faucet adapter, but it set the 
substantial fees that it would retain for itself, so it was positioned to 
insure against the risk of defective products.  As part of the [Fulfill-
ment by Amazon] agreement, Amazon required XMJ to register each 
product, and Amazon reserved the right to refuse to sell any of them.  
So Amazon was in a position to halt the flow of any defective goods 
of which it became aware.  And Amazon took steps to protect itself 
by requiring XMJ to indemnify Amazon.  Amazon also implicitly 
 
 92. 390 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019). 
 93. See id. at 969. Absent the satisfaction of certain conditions, in Wisconsin, “[a] seller 
or distributor of a product is not liable based on a claim of strict liability to a claimant.” WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 895.047(2) (2011). 
 94. State Farm, 390 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 
 95. Id. at 972 (citing Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (1990)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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represented that the adapter was safe by listing it for sale among its 
own products, and it expressly guaranteed timely delivery in good 
condition.  And, under Amazon’s A to Z guarantee, Amazon agreed 
to process returns and refunds if XMJ did not respond.  Amazon took 
on all the roles of a traditional—and very powerful—reseller/distrib-
utor.  The only thing Amazon did not do was take ownership of 
XMJ’s goods.99 
In December 2014, Heather Oberdorf purchased a retractable dog 
leash from an Amazon third-party seller identified as “The Furry 
Gang.”100  While walking her dog, using the leash on January 12, 2015, 
“Oberdorf suffered severe and permanent injuries to her left eye when 
the retractable leash malfunctioned, snapping backwards and hitting her 
in the face.”101  “Following the accident, the plaintiffs” (Heather and Mi-
chael Oberdorf) were “unable to make contact with The Furry Gang or 
with the manufacturer of the retractable leash,” but they did sue Amazon 
for strict products liability under § 402A.102  The District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania immediately addressed the issue of 
whether Amazon should be considered a “seller” under Pennsylvania’s 
adoption of § 402A.103  Noting that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has not ruled on whether an online sales listing service like Amazon 
Marketplace qualifies as a ‘seller’ under § 402A[,]”104 the court princi-
pally relied on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Musser v. Vilsmeier 
Auction Company, Inc.,105 which held an auctioneer was not a “seller” 
under § 402A.106  Analogizing the Amazon Marketplace Service with a 
newspaper’s classified advertisements (“connecting potential consumers 
with eager sellers in an efficient, modern, streamlined manner”),107 the 
district court concluded that subjecting Amazon to strict products liabil-
ity would not further the purpose § 402A108—“i.e., the ‘special respon-
sibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the 
business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498. 
 101. Id. at 497. 
 102. Id. at 498–500. 
 103. See id. at 500-01 (“Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined ‘seller’ 
under § 402A expansively, it has not left that category boundless.” (citation omitted)). 
 104. Id. at 501. 
 105. 562 A.2d 279 (1989). 
 106. See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 500–01; see also Musser, 562 A.2d at 376 (“[W]e 
hold that auctioneers are not ‘sellers’ within the meaning of [§ 402A].”). 
 107. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501. 
 108. Id. 
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the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that 
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods[.]’ ” 109 
Although Amazon and the district court relied on Musser, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals actually used the analysis in Musser to reverse 
the district court’s holding on strict liability.110  The appeals court fo-
cused on four factors articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
determining whether an actor is a “seller” under § 402A: 
(1) Whether the actor is the “only member of the marketing chain 
available to the injured plaintiff for redress”; 
(2) Whether “imposition of strict liability upon the [actor] serves as 
an incentive to safety”; 
(3) Whether the actor is “in a better position than the consumer to 
prevent the circulation of defective products”; and 
(4) Whether “[t]he [actor] can distribute the cost of compensating 
for injuries resulting from defects by charging for it in his business, i.e., 
by adjustment of the rental terms.”111 
The appeals court concluded that all four factors weigh in favor of 
imposing strict liability on Amazon.112 
Although Amazon argued every item sold through its Marketplace 
service could be traced to a third-party seller, the court noted that those 
third-party sellers can communicate with purchasers only through Ama-
zon, which enables them to conceal themselves from those purchasers.113  
The appeals court also noted that Amazon has no vetting process to en-
sure that its third-party sellers are amenable to legal process.114  Finally, 
the appeals court noted the other cases in which purchasers had been 
injured by allegedly defective products sold by Amazon third-party 
sellers who could not be located.115  The court believed that since Ama-
zon exerts significant control over its third-party sellers (e.g., its unfet-
tered right to suspend or terminate any third-party vendors or remove 
their products at any time) it is therefore capable, in its sole discretion, 
of removing unsafe products from its website, and imposing strict 
 
 109. Id. at 500 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 281 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A cmt. f.)). 
 110. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 143–44 (3rd Cir. 2019), opinion va-
cated, reh’g en banc granted, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 111. Id. at 144 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282). 
 112. Id. at 147–48. 
 113. Id. at 145. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 145 n.20 (citing Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *2 (D.N.J. July 
24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, No. 16-cv-3013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. May 
30, 2018); Stiner v. Amazon, 15-cv-185837 (Ohio. Com. Pl. Sept. 20, 2017) (Dkt. No. 120-
1), aff’d, 120 N.E.3d 885 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)). 
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liability would provide Amazon with an incentive to do so.116  The court 
also believed Amazon was in a better position than the consumer to pre-
vent the circulation of defective products because of its ongoing rela-
tionships with its third-party sellers.117  And it is through its own website 
that Amazon can better collect information to identify defective prod-
ucts—particularly because “Amazon specifically curtails the channels 
that third-party vendors may use to communicate with customers[.]”118  
Finally, the court believed Amazon was better able to distribute the cost 
of compensating for injuries resulting from defects because Amazon 
could adjust the commission-based fees that it charges to third-party 
sellers based on the risk sellers presented.119  The court concluded: “Am-
azon’s customers are particularly vulnerable in situations like the present 
case.  Neither the Oberdorfs nor Amazon has been able to locate the 
third-party vendor, The Furry Gang.  Conversely, had there been an in-
centive for Amazon to keep track of its third-party vendors, it might have 
done so.”120 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected Amazon’s argu-
ment that it was not a “seller” subject to strict liability under § 402A 
because it neither took nor transferred title to the product in question.121  
The appeals court noted that a Pennsylvania Superior Court ruling had 
determined that transfer of title was not required, and Pennsylvania’s 
Supreme Court had not repudiated that decision.122  The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ Oberdorf decision was vacated pending rehearing by 
the Third Circuit en banc.123  The rehearing was held February 19, 2020, 
and oral argument was to be limited to whether Amazon is subject to 
strict products liability claims as a “seller” under Pennsylvania law.124 
 
 116. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146. 
 117. Id. 146–47. 
 118. Id. at 147. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 147. 
 121. Id. at 148 (citing Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 452 A.2d 1349, 1354-55 (holding 
that a participant in a sales process may be held strictly liable for a defective product, even 
when the participant never took title nor possession of the product)). 
 122. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 148.   
 123. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 124. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4-16-cv-01127 (3rd Cir. Dec. 3, 2019) (Dkt. No. 
BL105) (order limiting scope of suit at February hearing). The Third Circuit panel reportedly 
was inclined toward certifying the question of Amazon’s status as a seller to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. See Martina Barash, Amazon ‘Seller’ Issue May Get Punted to Pennsylvania 
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Two early 2020 U.S. District Court cases have also indicated that 
Amazon should be considered a “seller” vis-à-vis third-party sales 
through its online Marketplace.  In Legal Aid of Nebraska, Inc. v. Chaina 
Wholesale, Inc.,125 the plaintiff brought negligence, strict failure to warn, 
and UCC breach of warranties claims under Nebraska law after a space 
heater,  purchased from a third-party on Amazon’s Marketplace, caused 
a fire.126  Without questioning whether Amazon was the actual “seller” 
of the space heater, the District Court for the District of Nebraska denied 
Amazon’s motion to dismiss on all counts (except an implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose claim).127 
Gartner v. Amazon.com, Inc. involved the sale of a generic Apple 
TV remote from a third-party seller through Amazon’s online Market-
place.128  The remote’s battery compartment opened, exposing a button 
battery that was ingested by the plaintiff’s nineteen-month-old daughter, 
resulting in serious injuries.129  As in most of the other third-party seller 
strict products liability actions, Amazon claimed it was not subject to the 
plaintiff’s claims because it was not the “seller” of the remote.130  Texas 
has an innocent seller statute,131 but a non-manufacturer seller can still 
be subject to a products liability action if the manufacture is not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the court.132  The Texas statute then provides that 
where a non-resident manufacturer fails to answer or otherwise make an 
appearance on time, the manufacturer will be deemed “not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the court unless the seller is able to secure personal juris-
diction over the manufacturer in the action.”133 
Since Amazon claimed it was not, in fact, the “seller,” the court 
turned to that issue.  The court first noted that based on Texas’s courts’ 
interpretation, § 402A applies to any person engaged in the business of 
selling a product for consumption, manufacturers, distributors, lessors, 
bailors, and dealers.134  Amazon argued it was more like an auctioneer 
that plays only an incidental role in a product’s placement in the stream 
 
52MDlXSkNBanc9PSIsInYiOiIxIn0 (reporting also that plaintiffs’ counsel favored certifica-
tion while Amazon’s counsel did not). 
 125. No. 4:19-CV-3103, 2020 WL 42471 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 2020). 
 126. See id. at *1. 
 127. See id. at *2–5. 
 128. No. 4:18-CV-02242, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2020) (order granting in part and 
denying in part motion for summary judgment). 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. Id. at 5. 
 131. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (West 2006); see also supra note 46 
and accompanying text. 
 132. See id. § 82.003(a)(7)(B). 
 133. See id. § 82.003(c) (emphasis added). 
 134. Gartner, slip op. at 8. 
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of commerce.135  The court, however, noted that Amazon, through its 
Fulfillment by Amazon service, stored the remote, packaged and pre-
pared it for delivery, and delivered it.136  While Amazon did not set the 
remote’s price, it set the fees it retained from the sale of the remote and 
it controls the process by which the customer pays for the product and 
the third-party seller receives payment.137  Amazon retained the right to 
withhold payments to the third-party seller and operated as the sole chan-
nel of communication between customers and third-party sellers.138  In 
sum, according to the court, Amazon was “integrally involved in and 
exert[ed] control over the sales of third-party products.”139 
Once again, Amazon argued it was not a seller because it never took 
title to the remote.140  The court noted, however, that “Texas law does 
not require an entity to transfer title or sell a product to be considered a 
seller.”141  Amazon also argued that it should not be considered a “seller” 
for public policy reasons by asserting it had “no relationship with the 
manufacturer, rendering it unable to directly pressure the manufacturer 
on safety or spread the cost of defects across units sold.”142  The court 
rejected this argument, noting that Amazon has the power to “halt the 
placement of defective products in the stream of commerce, deterring 
future injuries.”143  For these reasons, the District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas concluded Amazon was a “seller” subject to Texas’s 
innocent seller exception (meaning Amazon could be held liable if it is 
unable to secure personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer).144 
As discussed below and although outside the realm of strict prod-
ucts liability law, there are a few court decisions on what constitutes a 
“seller” that could apply by analogy to Amazon’s status in relation to 
third-party sales through its online Marketplace.  For example, in deter-
mining that Amazon’s third-party sellers were not the actual “sellers” on 
Amazon’s Marketplace for purposes of its state’s sales tax collection 
laws, and that it was Amazon that was “engaged in the business of 
 
 135. Id. at 10. 
 136. Id. at 11. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (emphasis added). 
 140. Gartner, slip op. at 14. See also Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 141; Fox, 2018 WL 
2431628, at *6; but see Fox, 930 F.3d at 422; Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 148. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 15. Furthermore, the court noted that Amazon required indemnification from 
third-party sellers for any strict products liability. See id. 
 144. Id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.003 (West 2006) (“[T]he 
manufacturer is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court unless the seller is able to secure 
personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer in the action.”). 
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selling,” the South Carolina Department of Revenue noted identical fac-
tors discussed in products liability cases, namely: 
(1) a purchase is often completed through Amazon Services’ website 
without any interaction between the customer and the [third-party] 
other than a product description (possibly) written by the [third-
party]; (2) the [third-party] is prohibited from accepting payment 
from the customer; (3) Amazon Services sends the order confirma-
tion to the customer; (4) Amazon Services notifies the customers 
when an order has been received or shipped; and (5) Amazon is the 
only party that provides a receipt for the products purchased.145 
In general, indirect purchasers—i.e., those who purchase through a 
middleman—cannot maintain an antitrust action.146  Apple raised this 
defense against iPhone users who had purchased third-party apps 
through Apple’s App Store, arguing that iPhone users are indirect pur-
chasers because they purchased the apps—not from Apple—but from 
the third-party app developers who set their own prices and used Apple 
only as a medium.147  The Supreme Court rejected Apple’s argument that 
its iPhone users were not direct purchasers merely because the third-
party app developers set the price.148  Nor did it matter that Apple never 
took title to the third-party apps: “Denying standing because ‘title’ never 
passes to a broker is an overly lawyered approach that ignores the reality 
that a distribution system that relies on brokerage is economically indis-
tinguishable from one that relies on purchaser-resellers.”149  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court refused to elevate form (the precise arrangement be-
tween manufacturers or suppliers and retailers) over substance (e.g., is 
the consumer harmed because of Amazon’s actions?).150 
C. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act 
Because Amazon operates through a website, it has, in some cases, 
raised a defense of immunity to liability for defective products under the 
 
 145. Amazon Services, LLC v. S.C. Dep’t of Rev., Docket No. 17-ALJ-17-0238-CC, slip 
op. at 46 (Sept. 10, 2019), https://src.bna.com/LXJ. 
 146. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-36 (1977) (rejecting the defense 
that indirect purchasers, as opposed to direct purchasers, were the injured parties of an alleged 
antitrust violation). 
 147. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518-19 (2019). 
 148. See id. at 1521–24. 
 149. Id. at 1523 (2019) (applying Clayton Act) (quoting 2A P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, 
R. Blair, & C. Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 345, at 183 (2014)). 
 150. See id. (specifically identifying the “substance” question as whether “the consumer 
paying a higher price because of the monopolistic retailer’s actions”). 
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Communications Decency Act (CDA).151  Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA 
provides, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”152  Since the sales in question are 
made by third-party sellers, Amazon claims that it is immune from lia-
bility for any information those third-party sellers posted on Amazon’s 
website regarding their products.153 
Section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.”154  As a result, “lawsuits seeking to hold 
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional edi-
torial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, post-
pone or alter content—are barred.”155  Courts use a three-part test to de-
termine whether a party is immune under § 230: “1) whether Defendant 
is a provider of an interactive computer service; 2) if the postings at issue 
are information provided by another information content provider; and 
3) whether Plaintiffs [sic] claims seek to treat Defendant as a publisher 
or speaker of third party content.”156  Generally, there is no question that 
Amazon operates an interactive computer service, or that information 
related to the product in question was posted by a third party.157 
However, the courts that have addressed this issue have distin-
guished Amazon’s liability for its own tortious conduct, such as negli-
gence or breach of implied warranty, from its liability as a publisher of 
information under a theory of failure to warn.158  But where a court has 
 
 151. See infra Appendix (summarizing recent products liability claims actions against 
Amazon and its CDA -defense); see also Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–
39 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2016)). 
 152. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 153. See, e.g., McDonald v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 536 (D. Md. 
2016). 
 154. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 544, 548 (E.D. 
Va. 2008), aff’d, 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 157. See McDonald, 219 F. Supp. 3d. at 537. 
 158. See id. at 538; Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 139–40 (“While the Communications De-
cency Act protects interactive computer service providers from liability as a publisher of 
speech, it does not protect them from liability as the seller of a defective product.”) (emphasis 
in original); Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 153 (“[T]o the extent that [the plaintiff]’s negligence and 
strict liability claims rely on Amazon’s role as an actor in the sales process, they are not barred 
by the CDA. However, . . . failure to warn claims are barred by the CDA.”); Order, Gartner, 
No. 4:18-cv-02242, at 17 (“Insofar as Plaintiff’s claims might relate to Amazon’s editorial 
control over the product detail page and failure to provide adequate warning on the page, those 
claims would be barred by the CDA . . . . As to Plaintiff’s claims that relate only to Amazon’s 
involvement in the sales process of third-party products, the CDA does not apply . . . .”); State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 973–74 (“Amazon’s active participation in the 
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determined Amazon is not a “seller,” it will most likely consider Ama-
zon’s CDA defense moot.159 
V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOLDING AMAZON 
STRICTLY LIABLE AS A “SELLER” 
Over the past 100 years, courts and state legislatures have elimi-
nated the privity of contract requirement to allow consumers injured by 
defective products to hold liable any party in the chain of distribution.160  
The underlying public policy has been that actors who place defective 
products into the stream of commerce should be liable to innocent pur-
chasers and users for damages and injuries suffered as a result of the 
defect.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability explains 
the rationale for holding non-manufacturer sellers strictly liable for de-
fective products they place in the stream of commerce: 
An often-cited rationale for holding wholesalers and retailers strictly 
liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects is that, as between 
them and innocent victims who suffer harm because of defective 
products, the product sellers as business entities are in a better posi-
tion than are individual users and consumers to insure against such 
losses.  In most instances, wholesalers and retailers will be able to 
pass liability costs up the chain of product distribution to the manu-
facturer.  When joining the manufacturer in the tort action presents 
the plaintiff with procedural difficulties, local retailers can pay dam-
ages to the victims and then seek indemnity from manufacturers.  Fi-
nally, holding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable creates incen-
tives for them to deal only with reputable, financially responsible 
manufacturers and distributors, thereby helping to protect the inter-
ests of users and consumers.161 
One exception to this elimination of privity has been to hold harm-
less “innocent” sellers who merely pass along products without modify-
ing them, affecting their packaging, or knowing of any defect.162  But 
even that exception has its own exception—many courts and state 
 
sale, through payment processing, storage, shipping, and customer service, is what makes it 
strictly liable. This is not activity immunized by the CDA.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Fox, 930 F.3d at 425 n.6; Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 3546197, at *12 
n.9; Carpenter, 2019 WL 1259158, at *3; Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Philadelphia In-
demnity Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-03115 (DRH)(AKT), 2019 WL 6525624, 
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2019). 
 160. See Steven Bonanno, Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Retrospect 
of and Prospects for Illinois Commercial Code 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 177, 178–90 
(1991). 
 161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
 162. See supra Part III. 
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statutes will still hold an innocent seller liable if the manufacturer of the 
defective product is insolvent, cannot be identified, or is not subject to 
service in the applicable court.163 
In many of the products liability lawsuits recently filed against Am-
azon, this exception to the exception would most likely apply—the man-
ufacturers of the defective products at issue simply cannot be identified, 
found, or subjected to the court’s jurisdiction.  In these cases, though, 
Amazon has argued this is all irrelevant, since it is not even a “seller” of 
the product in question.  It argues it merely served as a conduit between 
the consumer and the entity that actually sold the product to the con-
sumer.  The public policy question is whether Amazon should be al-
lowed to serve as a conduit to place defective products into the stream 
of commerce without any responsibility for the injuries and damages 
caused by those products. 
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Oberdorf pointed out, pub-
lic policy would be best served by imposing liability on Amazon in the 
following instances: (1) it is the “only member of the marketing chain 
available to the injured plaintiff for redress”; (2) holding it liable would 
“serve as an incentive to safety”; (3) Amazon is “in a better position than 
the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective products”; and (4) 
Amazon “can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting 
from defects by charging for it in its business,” i.e., by adjusting its terms 
of sales.164  All four of these public policy arguments apply to Amazon 
and many of its third-party sales.165 
In 2018, third-party sales on Amazon’s Marketplace were $160 bil-
lion,166 generating close to $50 billion in annual revenue for Amazon.167  
Amazon itself acknowledges that it faces potential liabilities for the 
products sold through third parties.168  And while Amazon may not take 
 
 163. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 33 and 44; note 46. 
 164. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (quoting Musser, 562 A.2d at 282). But see Eric Gold-
man, Opinion, Should Amazon Be Responsible When Its Vendors’ Products Turn Out to Be 
Unsafe? Critics of Amazon Say Legal Precedents Justify Holding the Company Liable for 
Third-Party Sellers’ Products. Others Say Amazon’s Scale Makes It Unfeasible to Do So, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-amazon-be-responsible-
when-its-vendors-products-turn-out-to-be-unsafe-11582898971. 
 165. See id. at 147–48 (“[A]lthough the four-factor test yielded a different result when 
applied by the Musser court to an auction house, all four factors in this case weigh in favor of 
imposing strict liability on Amazon.”). 
 166. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2, at *2 (Jeffrey P. Bezos Letter to 
Shareholders). 
 167. See, e.g., News Release, Amazon, Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter Sales up 
24% to $70.0 Billion (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://ir.aboutamazon.com/news-re-
leases/news-release-details/amazoncom-announces-third-quarter-sales-24-700-billion (sum-
ming revenues for third-party seller services for Q4 2018 through Q3 2019). 
 168. See Amazon 2018 Annual Report, supra note 2. 
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or transfer title, as the District Court for the Western District of Wiscon-
sin concluded, Amazon takes on “all the roles of a traditional—and very 
powerful—reseller/distributor.”169  Though arguing with respect to CDA 
immunity, Benjamin Edelman’s and Abbey Stemler’s conclusion applies 
equally to strict products liability: “[U]ntouchable intermediaries not 
only facilitate bad behavior but also are likely to disproportionately hurt 
those most vulnerable.”170  Meanwhile, as third-party sales through its 
online Marketplace have grown, there are indications Amazon is losing 
control of not only who is selling on its website, but also the quality of 
the products sold.171  Perhaps if Amazon had an incentive—in the form 
of potential strict products liability—to keep better track of its third-
party vendors, it might do so.172 
Amazon has been primarily successful in avoiding strict products 
liability claims for third party sales by arguing it is not actually a “seller.”  
Since most state products liability statutes do not define seller,173 this has 
left—primarily federal—courts to fashion their own interpretation (often 
of what the state courts would conclude).174  Ideally, states should adopt 
a formal definition of “seller” for strict products liability purposes, and 
arguably a very broad one. Georgia has done just that: 
[T]he term “product seller” means a person who, in the course of a 
business conducted for the purpose leases or sells and distributes; 
 
 169. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 F. Supp. 3d at 972. 
 170. Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal 
Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 197 (2019). 
 171. See Safdar et al., supra note 17; Berzon et al., supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146 (finding in favor of imposing strict liability on Ama-
zon, in part, because it “is fully capable . . . of removing unsafe products from its website” 
and “[i]mposing strict liability upon Amazon would be an incentive to do so”). 
 173. See James H. Rotondo, Jennifer L. Shukla, and Julia M. Sorenson, INSIGHT: Ama-
zon Tests Boundaries of What It Means to Be a Product Seller, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 17, 
2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/insight-amazon-
tests-boundaries-of-what-it-means-to-be-a-product-seller (exploring the ways that various 
courts have used definitions of “seller” with respect to Amazon); but see ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-681(9) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 13-21-401(3) (West 2003); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 18, § 7001(a)(4) (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (West 1987); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-1(4) (West 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(15)(a) (West 
2001); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(3) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 7.72.010(1) (West 1991). 
 174. Procedurally, this can raise a barrier for plaintiffs. While clearly recognizing that 
Maryland’s highest court may conclude Amazon is a “seller” for public policy reasons, Judge 
Motz of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that federal courts sitting in diversity 
“must proceed with caution.” Erie Ins. Co., 925 F.3d at 145 (Motz, J. concurring). Judge Motz 
declined to predict whether Maryland courts would treat Amazon as a seller under state law 
“[g]iven the policy-intensive nature of this inquiry, the lack of on-point Maryland precedent, 
and Amazon’s novel business model.” Id. (noting “Amazon’s strategy of removing nearly 
every products liability case to federal court has complicated this endeavor and arguably 
stunted the development of state law”). 
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installs; prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles 
pursuant to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications, 
or formulation; or repairs; maintains; or otherwise is involved in 
placing a product in the stream of commerce.175 
State products liability statutes could then include partial innocent 
seller defenses to liability unless the following exceptions apply: (1) the 
seller exercised some significant control over the design or manufacture 
of the product, or provided instructions or warnings to the manufacturer 
relative to the alleged defect in the product which caused the injury, 
death or damage; (2) the seller had actual knowledge of the defect; (3) 
the seller is a controlled subsidiary of a manufacturer, or the manufac-
turer is a controlled subsidiary of the seller; (4) the seller created the 
defect or provided the plans or specifications for the manufacture or 
preparation of the product and such plans or specifications were a prox-
imate cause of the defect; or (5) the defect was the result of the seller’ 
negligence or the breach of an express warranty made by the seller.  In 
particular, the innocent seller defense would not apply in these situa-
tions: (1) the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the ju-
risdiction of the courts of the state, or, despite due diligence, the manu-
facturer is not amenable to service of process; (2) the manufacturer is 
unable to satisfy any judgment as determined by the court; or (3) the 
court determines that the manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a rea-
sonable settlement or other agreement with the plaintiff. 
This approach would satisfy the public policy justifications for 
strict products liability expressed in Restatement (Third) Torts: Products 
Liability: Amazon is in a better position, relative to an innocent pur-
chaser, to insure against losses; Amazon can always seek indemnity 
from the manufacturer; and this approach can incentivize Amazon to al-
low only reputable and financially responsible third parties to sell prod-
ucts through its marketplace platform.176 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When courts were first presented with the issue of whether Ama-
zon was a “seller” in third-party sales transactions, they relied on very 
thin precedent to conclude Amazon was not a “seller” (principally be-
cause it never took nor transferred title) and therefore had no liability 
for the defective product purchased (usually under an Amazon Prime 
membership and shipped by Amazon).177  Courts and legislatures need 
 
 175. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(A) (emphasis added). 
 176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998), supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 177. See, e.g., supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
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to recognize Amazon has disrupted the supply chain: “By design, Ama-
zon’s business model cuts out the middlemen between manufacturers 
and consumers, reducing the friction that might keep foreign (or other-
wise judgment-proof) manufacturers from putting dangerous products 
on the market.”178  If courts were to instead examine the realities of the 
transactions in question—Amazon’s control over third parties and in-
volvement in the sales and delivery processes—and factor in public 
policy considerations, they may reach a different conclusion: of the 
millions of products Amazon sells to millions of households—in which 
it is much more than peripherally involved—it should be liable for de-
fective products it places into the stream of commerce. 
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damage to a home 
RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF 








U.S.C. § 230 
No strict liability 
for Amazon since 
it is a marketplace 
provider, not a 
“seller,” outside 
of the distributive 
chain; Amazon 
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Case Product/Incident Law(s) Applied Conclusion 
Oberdorf v. 
Amazon.com, 
Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 3d 496 
(M.D. Pa. 






Inc., 930 F.3d 















U.S.C. § 230 
Amazon not a 
“seller” for 
purposes of § 










Inc., 930 F.3d 




en banc in 
Oberdorf v. 
Amazon.com, 
Inc., 936 F.3d 



























from claims for 
failure to warn, 
but not in role as 
seller of a 
defective product 
State Farm v. 
Amazon.com, 
Inc., 390 F. 
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of product weighs 
in favor of 




failure to provide 
or edit adequate 
warnings are 




Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. 
Amazon.com, 
Inc., 407 F. 






party seller burst 
into flame and 


























Dec. 4, 2019) 
Defective blender 
allegedly caused 
fire in restaurant 
where it was used 









U.S.C. § 230 
Amazon not a 
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Case Product/Incident Law(s) Applied Conclusion 
State Farm 
Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. 
Amazon.com, 
Inc., 414 F. 






party seller burst 
into flame and 







ANN. § 11-1-63; 
negligence; 
failure to warn 
Amazon is a 
marketplace 
facilitator subject 
to negligence and 
negligent failure 
to warn claims for 
defective 
hoverboard 
Legal Aid of 
Nebraska, 



















to dismiss (except 
as to implied 
warranty of 
fitness for a 
particular 
purpose claim); 
no discussion of 
whether Amazon 












Tex. Jan. 7, 
2020) (Dkt. 
No. 60) 
Generic Apple TV 
remote’s battery 
compartment 
opened, exposing a 
button battery that 




in serious injuries 
RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A; 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. 









U.S.C. § 230 
Amazon is a 
“seller” because it 
is integrally 
involved in and 
exerts control 
over the sales of 
third-party 
products; CDA 
applies only to 
editorial content 
on Amazon’s 
website 
 
 
